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TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-DAMAGES-A RIGHT OF 
RECOVERY EXISTS FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
INJURIES ARISING FROM THE FEAR OF CONTRACTING 
AN INFECTIOUS DISEASE, EVEN WHEN SUCH INJURIES 
ARE UNACCOMPANIED BY PHYSICAL IMP ACT AND 
THE DISEASE IS NOT CONTRACTED. Faya v. Almaraz, 
329 Md. 435, 620 A.2d 327 (1993). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As incidents of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)I 
reach epidemic proportions, an increasing number of individuals 
infected with the disease must deal with the harsh physical and 
psychological trauma associated with the reality that he or she will 
likely die from the disease. Even the fear of coIitracting AIDS, with 
or without a positive diagnosis of HIV infection, can result in 
emotional distress that may significantly impact upon one's life. 2 
Whether an individual may recover damages for this emotional 
distress, regardless of whether the disease eventually manifests itself, 
is a topic of continuing debate. Some might argue that one who is 
diagnosed as HIV-negative should be thankful for that diagnosis, 
and forego any attempt to recover damages for the emotional distress 
1. AIDS is caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), a retrovirus that 
attacks the human immune system by invading host cells and replicating itself. 
Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 439, 620 A.2d 327, 328 (1993). While the virus 
may be latent for as long as ten years, it gradually weakens the immune system 
and ultimately destroys the body's capacity to resist disease. Id. at 439, 620 
A.2d at 328-29. An individual infected with AIDS suffers from a severely 
compromised immune system, and is subjected to numerous diseases and other 
infections that an otherwise healthy individual may be able to resist. Id. at 
439, 620 A.2d at 329. 
2. Individuals faced with the fear of contracting AIDS have suffered from 
headaches, sleeplessness, nervous shock, fear, anxiety, grief, loss of appetite, 
and post-traumatic stress disorder, among other ailments. Id. at.442, 620 A.2d 
at 330; see a/so Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 
891-92 (W. Va. 1991). Emotional reactions of this nature can so significantly 
affect the victim's life that psychological counselling is required. Id. at 891-
92. Such psychological reactions may also render its victims unable to function 
normally. Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 501,408 A.2d 728, 734 (1979). 
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suffered before the negative test results were received. Several of the 
nation's courts, including the Court of Appeals of Maryland, have 
taken the contrary view. 3 
In Faya v. AlmaraZ,4 the court of appeals held that Sonya Faya 
(Faya) and Perry Mahoney Rossi (Rossi) (collectively, appellants) 
could recover monetary damages for the fear of contracting AIDS, 
notwithstanding their HIV -negative diagnoses, if the injuries occa-
sioned by their fear could be objectively demonstrated. s Recovery 
was limited, however, to injuries sustained from the time the appel-
lants first learned that they may have come in contact with the AIDS 
virus to the time they received their HIV-negative test results.6 
By allowing recovery for the mere fear of contracting an infec-
tious disease, the Faya decision further defines the limits of compen-
sable harm resulting from emotional distress. Increased litigation for 
the recovery of damages for emotional distress injuries will surely be 
one effect of the decision. Even if courts adhere to the objective 
determination rule, the total amount of damages awarded in emo-
tional distress actions may skyrocket because juries can now award 
damages to plaintiffs who were previously ineligible to receive them. 
The appellants were patients of Dr. Rudolf Almaraz (Dr. Al-
maraz or Almaraz), an oncological surgeon specializing in breast 
cancer.7 Unbeknownst to each patient, they were operated on by Dr. 
Almaraz at a time when he knew that he was infected with the HIV 
virus. 8 Almaraz had operated on Faya before he developed AIDS, 
3. See infra notes 4, 87-90 and accompanying text. 
4. 329 Md. 435, 620 A.2d 327 (1993). The companion case of Rossi v. Almaraz 
is reported with Faya because it arises from a similar set of facts and 
circumstances. 
5. [d. at 439, 620 A.2d at 338-39. The court of appeals did not specifically state 
how an injury may be objectively demonstrated. Presumably, the injury must 
be reasonable under the circumstances, -and should be manifested by an external 
condition or evidence indicative of a mental state. See, e.g., Vance, 286 Md. 
490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979) (allowing plaintiff to recover for emotional distress 
injuries where testimony indicated that she suffered from spontaneous crying, 
was unable to function normally, and was too embarrassed to socialize, and 
where such injuries were manifested in the deterioration of her physical 
appearance); Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909) 
(holding that plaintiff may recover damages for fright and nervousness, where 
such injuries rendered plaintiff unable to perform her household duties and 
resulted in a medical diagnosis of nervous exhaustion). 
6. Faya, 329 Md. at 455-56, 620 A.2d at 337. The court of appeals defined this 
period as the reasonable window of anxiety. [d. at 456, 620 A.2d at 337. The 
window of anxiety closes once satisfactory information becomes available to 
put the fear of injury to rest. [d. at 456 n.lO, 620 A.2d at 337 n.l0. The court 
implied that any emotional distress that continued after the appellants tested 
HIV-negative might be unreasonable. [d. at 455, 620 A.2d at 337. 
7. [d. at 440, 620 A.2d at 329. 
8. [d. 
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but had operated on Rossi shortly after being diagnosed with cyto-
megalovirus retinitis, an eye infection characteristic of full-blown 
AIDS.9 Almaraz died of AIDS on November 16, 1990.10 
The appellants learned of Almaraz's illness for the first time on 
December 6, 1990, when they read about it in a local newspaper.1I 
They immediately underwent blood tests which disclosed that neither 
appellant was a carrier of the HIV virus. 12 Nonetheless, by December 
11, 1990, the appellants had commenced separate suits against Al-
maraz's estate, his Maryland professional association business entity, 
and Johns Hopkins Hospital for compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. 13 In their complaints, the appellants alleged that they suffered 
9. Id. Almaraz first learned that he was a carrier of the HIV virus in 1986. Id. 
Faya's operations occurred in October, 1988 and March, 1989. Id. Rossi's 
operation took place on November 14, 1989. Id. Almaraz's first diagnosis of 
cytomegalovirus retinitis was on October 27, 1989; this diagnosis was confirmed 
by a second opthamologist on November 17, 1989. Id. 
1O.Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 441, 620 A.2d at 329. The precise date that the appellants learned of 
their HIV-negative status, when contrasted with the date they filed suit, is 
unclear. Impliedly, they knew of their HIV-negative status sometime after 
December 6, 1990 (when they first learned of Almaraz's illness), but on or 
before December 11, 1990 (when they commenced suit against his estate for 
compensatory and punitive damages). Id. Assuming both Faya and Rossi knew 
of their HIV-negative status on the day the suit was filed, at a maximum, 
their reasonable window of anxiety and the period for which they could recover 
damages for their emotional distress was five days. Conceivably, the reasonable 
window of anxiety could have been confined to mere hours, if the HIV-negative 
test results were received later in the same day that the appellants learned of 
Almaraz's illness. 
13. Id. Both appellants alleged negligence, negligent failure to obtain their informed 
consent, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 441, 620 
A.2d at 330. Faya's complaint also alleged negligent misrepresentation and 
breach of contract. Id. Rossi's amended complaint contained the additional 
allegations of loss of consortium, breach of fiduciary duty, and battery. Id. 
Of these counts, the court of appeals did not address those relating to fraud, 
negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, loss of consortium, or breach 
of fiduciary duty. In briefly addressing the count alleging battery, the court 
concluded that the cause of action for lack of informed consent is one in tort 
for negligence, and not one in tort for battery. Id. at 450 n.6, 620 A.2d at 
334 n.6. 
The court focused its analysis on what it deemed to be the core of 
appellants' complaints-the allegations that Almaraz acted wrongfully in per-
forming the appellants' operations without first informing them that he was 
HI V-positive (and in Rossi's case, infected with AIDS), and that Almaraz and 
Johns Hopkins Hospital failed to inform the appellants of any risk of con-
tracting HIV incidental to Almaraz's performance of the operations. Id. at 
441, 620 A.2d at 330. The appellants claimed that had they known of Dr. 
Almaraz's illness, they could have withheld consent to their operations and 
could thereby have avoided any exposure to the HIV virus. Id. at 441-42, 620 
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from intense fear of contracting the AIDS virus as a proximate result 
of the surgeries and their subsequent discovery of Dr. Almaraz's 
illness. 14 
II. BACKGROUND 
To recover damages for emotional distress, a plaintiff's injuries 
must be predicated lipon the wrongful act of another. Thus, a claim 
for emotional distress damages frequently accompanies a suit for 
negligence. 
Negligence is commonly defined as conduct that fails to meet 
the established legal standard for the protection of others against 
unreasonable risks of harm. IS To sustain an action in negligence, a 
plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) that the defendant had a 
legal duty to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the 
protection of others; (2) that the defendant breached this duty; (3) 
that there was a reasonable causal connection between the breach 
and the injury to the plaintiff; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered 
damage or actual loss resulting from the breach. 16 
In the AIDS context, a physician entrusted with the preservation 
of human life and the reduction of suffering may have an ethical 
duty to inform his patients of his HIV-positive status. However, the 
relevant inquiry is whether a similar duty is imposed upon the 
physician by law. While there is little guidance from existing case 
law concerning an HI V-positive physician's duty to inform his patient 
of his HI V-positive status, an examination of the elements of negli-
gence and their application in the context of infectious disease cases, 
including AIDS, lends support for the imposition of such a duty. 
A. Duty 
A duty isa legally recognized obligation to conform to a certain 
standard of conduct toward another .17 Foreseeability is often an 
important factor used to determine the existence of a duty.IS If it is 
A.2d at 330. Faya and Rossi's complaints alluded to the possibility that a 
puncture or laceration in Almaraz's protective garments could have allowed 
the commingling of his blood with their blood; however, they did not offer 
proof of such puncture or laceration. [d. 
14. [d. at 442, 620 A.2d at 330. The other injuries alleged by the appellants 
included exposure to HIV and the risk of AIDS, physical injury and expenses 
arising from HIV testing, pain, anxiety, grief, nervous shock, severe emotional 
distress, headaches, and sleeplessness. [d. 
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965). 
16. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, 
at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984). 
17. [d. § 53, at 356. 
18. B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 141, 538 A.2d 1175, 1178 (1988). 
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foreseeable that harm will befall another because of an actor's 
conduct, the actor may have a duty to refrain from engaging in that 
conduct. 19 
The recognition of a duty to prevent the transmission of infec-
tious diseases is well-established. 20 This duty extends to cases involving 
the negligent transmission of venereal diseases.21 A recent Maryland 
case is illustrative. 
In B.N. v. K. K., 22 the plaintiff and the defendant were involved 
in a sexual relationship during a period when the defendant knew he 
was infected with genital herpes, but failed to so inform the plaintiff. 23 
Such failure included an occasion when the defendant was aware 
that his genital herpes was active and would be transmitted, but the 
defendant nonetheless engaged in sexual intercourse with the plain-
tiff.24 Subsequent to this particular encounter, the plaintiff discovered 
she was infected with the disease.2s 
In addressing the plaintiff's negligence cause of action, the B.N. 
court began with an inquiry into whether the defendant had a duty 
to inform the plaintiff of his infection.26 The court observed that the 
concept of duty is predicated upon the "responsibility each of us 
bears to exercise due care to avoid unreasonable risks of harm to 
others. "27 Because the defendant knew that he had active genital 
19. [d. at 141, 538 A.2d at 1178. 
20. See Gilbert v. Hoffman, 23 N.W. 632 (Iowa 1885) (sustaining plaintiff's 
negligence action against hotel operator whose misrepresentation that premises 
were free from smallpox infection induced plaintiff to stay in hotel, given 
evidence that plaintiff later contracted smallpox during her stay); Earle v. 
Kuklo, 98 A.2d 107 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953) (recognizing cause of 
action on behalf of plaintiff who contracted tuberculosis from her parents' 
landlord, where the landlord, although infected with tuberculosis, negligently 
failed to warn tenants of her infection and failed to abstain from close personal 
contact with those tenants); Smith v. Baker, 20 F. 709 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884) 
(permitting recovery based on negligence of father who took his children into 
plaintiff's boarding house while infected with whooping cough, thereby infecting 
plaintiff's child and the children of her boarders). 
21. See, e.g., Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1989) (recognizing a 
negligence cause of action for transmission of genital herpes); Duke v. Housen, 
589 P.2d 334 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863 (1979) (recognizing the existence 
of a claim for negligent transmission of gonorrhea, but reversing plaintiff's 
damage award because the claim was filed after expiration of statute of 
limitations). 
22. 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988). 
23. [d. at 138, 538 A.2d at 1177. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. at 138-39, 538 A.2d at 1177. The plaintiff knew that the defendant was 
the source of her infection because she had been monogamous throughout the 
course of their relationship. [d. 
26. [d. at 141, 538 A.2d at 1178. 
27. Moran v. Faberge, 273 Md. 538, 543, 332 A.2d 11, 15 (1975), quoted in B.N.,_ 
312 Md. at 141, 538 A.2d at 1178. 
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herpes, yet engaged in sexual intercourse with the plaintiff, the court 
held that it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff would be 
harmed by the defendant's conduct.28 Therefore, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland held that the defendant had a duty to either refrain 
from having sexual intercourse with the plaintiff, or advise her of 
his infection prior thereto. 29 
While the existence of a cause of action for the negligent 
transmission of AIDS is an issue of first impression in most juris-
dictions, of the few courts that have been confronted with the issue, 
most have been willing to impose a duty similar to that imposed in 
B.N. v. K.K.30 For example, in Doe v. Johnson ,3) a case involving 
Los Angeles Lakers basketball superstar Earvin "Magic" Johnson, 
Jr., the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Michigan held that a defendant owes a duty to his sexual partner to 
disclose the fact that he may have the HIV virus if, at the time of 
their sexual relationship, he (1) had actual knowledge that he was 
infected with the HIV virus, (2) had experienced symptoms associated 
with the HIV virus, or (3) had actual knowledge that a prior sexual 
partner had been diagnosed with the HIV virus.32 The court observed 
that where any of these factual scenarios are present, the "burden 
on [the infected] individual in revealing his or her HIV virus infor-
mation is minimal when compared to the high risks of the disease. "33 
The Supreme Court of New York expressed a similar philosophy 
in Petri v. Bank of New York CO.34 The plaintiff who did not have 
AIDS and was not infected with the HIV virus, brought a claim 
28. B.N., 312 Md. at 143, 538 A.2d at 1179. 
29. [d. 
30. 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988). 
31. 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1993). The plaintiff, Jane Doe, alleged that 
Johnson had a legal duty to prevent the transmission of the HIV virus to her, 
and that he negligently breached that legal duty because he knew or should 
have known that he was infected with the virus. [d. at 1386. Allegedly, Johnson 
transmitted the HIV virus to Doe during one or both of their sexual encounters. 
[d. at 1385. Doe further alleged that because Johnson was sexually active with 
multiple partners prior to his sexual encounters with her, he knew or should 
have known that he had a high risk of becoming infected with the HIV virus. 
[d. Specifically, Doe argued that Johnson should have (1) warned her about 
his sexually promiscuous past, (2) informed her at the time of their sexual 
contact that he either "may have HIV" or did have HIV, (3) not engaged in 
sexual contact with her, or (4) used a condom or similar method of protection 
that would act as a barrier to transmission of the HIV virus to Doe. [d. 
32. [d. at 1393. Thus, if Doe could prove that Johnson had actual knowledge of 
his HIV infection at the time of their sexual encounters, had experienced 
symptoms of such an infection prior thereto, or had actual knowledge that a 
prior sexual partner had been diagnosed with the HIV virus prior thereto, she 
would have a valid cause of action against Johnson for negligent transmission 
of the HIV virus. [d. 
33. [d. 
34. 582 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). 
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against Vaughn, a fellow bank employee, for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress. 3s Although the claim was not sufficiently 
explained in the plaintiff's pleadings, it was apparently founded upon 
allegations that the plaintiff had a sexual relationship with Vaughn, 
and that Vaughn failed to inform the plaintiff until the conclusion 
of their relationship that he was HIV-positive.36 
The court held that the plaintiff's claim against Vaughn was too 
speculative and remote. 37 When discussing whether an infected indi-
vidual has a duty to inform his sexual partner of his HIV -positive 
status, however, the court opined that the infected individual has a 
duty "to use reasonable care not to transmit a sentence of death to 
his or her partner. "38 The court implied that this duty arises from 
the "special" relationship between the parties.39 The court further 
opined that "if the state is to maintain the role of protector against 
needless death,' '40 a duty to warn a sexual partner of HIV infection 
must be established.41 The court also cited the existence of a great 
and overriding public interest in limiting the spread of AIDS as 
support for the imposition of this duty.42 
35. ld. at 609-10. Vaughn was one of several named defendants in this action. 
Plaintiff's.primary claim was against the Bank of New York Mortgage Company 
(the Bank) for wrongful discharge due to discrimination and the Bank's fear 
that he had AIDS or was at a high risk for contracting AIDS. ld. at 610. The 
claim against the Bank was founded upon § 296(l)(a) of the Human Rights 
Law, which prohibits employers and others from engaging in discriminatory 
conduct against those with disabilities. ld. at 610-11. AIDS and HIV infection 
are disabilities falling within the protection that this section of the Human 
Rights Law affords. ·ld. The protection extends to those with actual disabilities, 
as well as to those whose disabilities are merely perceived. ld. at 611. Accord-
ingly, the plaintiff's cause of action against the Bank for wrongful discharge 
could be maintained if he could prove that the perception that he had AIDS 
was the motivating force for his termination. ld. at 612. 
36. ld. at 612-13. 
37. ld. at 614. The court reasoned that "[s]omeone who has been exposed to HIV 
infection but has not come down with it has not suffered a physical injury for 
which a recovery in damages may be allowed." ld. at 613. While the court 
thus dismissed the plaintiff's claim against Vaughn, the dismissal was without 
prejudice, thereby allowing the plaintiff to "reinstate [his claim] in the event 
[he] becomes infected with HIV." ld. at 614. 
38. ld. at 613. 
39. ld. The court opined that the "uniquely intimate and special form of contact" 
, present in a sexual relationship necessitates the imposition of a duty to warn 
one's sexual partner of HIV infection. ld. But cf. Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. 
Supp. 1382, 1393 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (imposing a duty to disclose HIV infection 
to a sexual partner, but placing little emphasis on the sexual relationship 
between the parties because "no special duties" arise from a consensual sexual 
encounter between two adults). 
40. 582 N.Y.S.2d 608, 613 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). 
41. ld. at 613. 
42. ld. Arguably, these principles apply with equal force to non-sexual relationships. 
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B. Breach 
Once a duty is legally recognized, there must be some standard 
by which the court is able to determine whether the actor has breached 
that duty. A breach of a legal duty is commonly defined as the 
failure of an individual to conform to the required standard of 
conduct.43 
Traditionally, the required standard of conduct in negligence 
actions is that of the reasonable person under like circumstances.44 
It has been stated that an actor "should realize that his act involves 
an unreasonable risk of [harm], if a reasonable man knowing so 
much of the circumstances surrounding the actor at the time of his 
act as the actor knows or should know, would realize the existence 
of the risk and its unreasonable character.' '4S 
The reasonable person standard has been previously applied by 
the courts in the context of infectious diseases. 46 The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland, in B.N. v. K.K.,47 recognized that "[w]hen a reasonable 
person knows or should have known that certain types of conduct 
constitute an unreasonable risk of harm to another, he or she has 
the duty to refrain from that conduct."48 Thus, assuming as true the 
plaintiff's allegations that the defendant knew he was infected with 
genital herpes at the time of their sexual encounter, the defendant 
"had a duty either to refrain from sexual contact with [plaintiff] or 
to warn her of his condition. "49 If the defendant "negligently failed 
to do either, he breached his duty. "50 
Likewise, in Long v. Adams,s I the Georgia Court of Appeals 
concluded that the defendant breached the duty of ordinary care not 
to injure others when, knowing that she was infected with genital 
43. KEETON, supra note 6, at 164. 
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965). Where the individual upon 
whom the duty is imposed has special knowledge, such as a physician, that 
individual may be held to a heightened standard of care. [d. § 290 cmt. f. 
45. [d. § 284 cmt. a. 
46. See Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686, 689 (Ala. 1989); R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 
428 N.W.2d 103, 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) ("A reasonable person should 
know that if he/she has a contagious, sexually transmittable disease ... the 
disease is likely to be communicated through sexual contact."); Kliegel v. 
Aitken, 69 N.W. 67, 68 (Wis. 1896) ("[DIne who negligently-that is, through 
want of ordinary care-exposes another to an infectious or contagious disease, 
which such other thereby contracts, is liable in damages therefor, in the absence 
of contributory negligence .... "). 
47. 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988). 
48. McCance v. Lindau, 63 Md. App. 504, 514, 492 A.2d 1352, 1358 (1985), 
quoted in B.N., 312 Md. at 141, 538 A.2d at 1178. 
49. B.N., 312 Md. at 143, 538 A.2d at 1179. 
50. [d. 
51. 333 S.E:2d 852 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). 
1993] . Faya v. Almaraz 277 
herpes, she engaged in sexual intercourse with the plaintiff without 
informing him of her infection.52 Similarly, in Doe v. Johnson ,53 
although the court did not address the truth of the plaintiff's factual 
allegations that Johnson knew or should have known that he had or 
may have had HIV at the time of his sexual encounters with her, 
impliedly, if these allegations were proven, Johnson would have 
breached a legal duty to the plaintiff to inform her that he either 
had or may have had the HIV virus. 54 The court noted that the risk 
to the plaintiff of contracting the disease outweighed the burden on 
Johnson to reveal his HIV virus information.55 
c. Causal Connection 
If a plaintiff is able to establish the existence of a legal duty 
and the· subsequent breach of that duty by a defendant, the plaintiff 
must then establish a causal connection between the defendant's 
action and the damage or injuries that the plaintiff has suffered. 
This causal connection is frequently referred to as "proximate cause," 
a court-established limitation on a defendant's responsibility for the 
consequences of his conduct. 56 While this limitation is often examined 
in light of the nature and degree of the factual connection between 
the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's damages, policy consid-
erations also play an important role.57 
Where the transmission of infectious diseases is at issue, causa-
tion may be easily established if the defendant is the only individual 
who could have infected the plaintiff. 58 Such was the case in B.N. 
v. K.K.59 The plaintiff had not engaged in sexual contact with anyone 
other than the defendant during the relevant period; hence, the genital 
herpes she contracted could only have been a result of the defendant's 
conduct.60 
Similarly, in Berner v. Caldwell, 61 where the plaintiff presented 
credible evidence that she contracted a disease that could only be 
52. [d. at 854. 
53. 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1993). 
54. [d. at 1393. But see C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) 
(holding that defendant, who learned he had AIDS after his relationship with 
plaintiff, was under no duty to warn plaintiff when, at the time of their 
relationship, it was not reasonably foreseeable that he had the disease or that 
plaintiff would suffer harm through intimate sexual contact with defendant). 
55. Doe, 817 F. Supp. at 1393. 
56. KEETON, supra note 16, § 41, at 263-64. 
57. [d. 
58. See B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1I75 (1988). In cases involving 
sexually transmitted diseases, causation may be more difficult to prove if any 
number of sexual partners could have transmitted the disease to plaintiff. 
59. [d. 
60. [d. at 138, 538 A.2d at 1I77. 
61. 543 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1989). 
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transmitted through sexual contact, that the defendant was the only 
individual with whom she had sexual contact, that she did not have 
the disease prior to her relationship with the defendant, and that 
before the end of their relationship she discovered she was infected 
with the disease, the inference that the defendant had infected the 
plaintiff was sufficient to support a claim of negligence. 62 
The transmission of the HIV virus through sexual contact is 
sufficiently analogous to these cases to support the proposition that 
causation may be easily established if the defendant is the only HIV-
infected individual with whom the plaintiff had contact of the type 
and nature sufficient to transmit the disease. Presumably, once a 
legal duty is established and it is shown that the defendant breached 
that duty, a causal connection between the defendant's breach and 
the plaintiff's injuries will follow. 
D. Damages 
Once causation is established, it is likely that any physical pain 
and suffering or related damages will be sufficient to satisfy the last 
element of negligence.63 Where an infectious disease is actually con-
tracted, the element of damages is generally satisfied. Damage in 
B.N. v. K.K.64 occurred when the plaintiff contracted genital herpes, 
"a serious, painful, and incurable disease. "65 
Damages similar in nature may occur through the negligent 
transmission of the HIV virus. The damages alleged by the plaintiff 
in Doe v. lohnsorf>6 included physical illness, severe emotional dis-
tress, loss of enjoyment of life, medical expenses, and lost wages 
and benefits.67 Although at the time of her action Doe had not yet 
developed AIDS, she was certain to acquire it and "suffer a slow, 
certain, and painful death. "68 
62. [d. at 688. 
63. It may be difficult to establish actual loss if the only injuries alleged result 
from emotional distress. See infra notes 100-15 and accompanying text. 
64. 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988). 
65. [d. at 143, 538 A.2d at 1179. Genital herpes is a sexually transmitted viral 
disease that may be chronic and recurring, and for which no known cure exists. 
[d. at 140 n.5, 538 A.2d at 1178 n.5. Its characteristics include itching, burning 
genitalia, pain on urination, headaches, swollen lymph nodes, general muscular 
aches, fever, and overall discomfort. [d. at 140 n.4, 538 A.2d at 1178 n.4. It 
is the third most common sexually transmitted disease and can result in 
occasional complications such as meningitis and radiculitis. [d. at 140 n. 7, 538 
A.2d at 1178 n.7. Genital herpes has also been associated with the development 
of cervical cancer, with the dangers of miscarriage and premature delivery 
during childbirth, and with a high mortality rate for the children of its carriers. 
[d. at 144, 538 A.2d at 1180. 
66. 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1993). 
67. [d. at 1385. 
68. [d. 
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III. THE INSTANT CASE 
In Faya, the appellants alleged that Dr. Almaraz was negligent 
in failing to inform them of his HIV-positive status.69 The damages 
alleged by the appellants consisted primarily of emotional distress 
and related injuries.10 
To prevail in their negligence action, Almaraz must have breached 
a duty of care owed to the appellants, and that breach must have 
been the proximate cause of their injuries.lI The court thus began 
its analysis by deciding whether Dr. Almaraz owed a duty to the 
appellants to either inform them of his condition or to refrain from 
operating upon them.72 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland previously examined the 
scope of duty owed by one infected with a sexually transmitted 
disease in B.N. v. K.K.,13 where it held that the defendant had a 
legal duty to the plaintiff to either refrain from sexual contact with 
her, or to inform her of his infected condition prior to such contact. 14 
The similarities between genital herpes and AIDS,1s in addition to 
the basic concept underlying the imposition of a duty, 16 allowed the 
Faya court to arrive at a similar conclusion. Because AiDS may be 
transmitted from surgeon to patient during an operation if the 
69. 329 Md. 435, 447, 620 A.2d 327, 333 (1988). 
70. [d. at 441, 620 A.2d at 330. 
71. [d. 
72. [d. 
73. 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988). 
74. [d. at 142, 538 A.2d at 1179. The duty arose because of the highly infectious 
nature of genital herpes and the foreseeability of its transmission. [d. 
75. [d. Genital herpes is a sexually transmitted disease that is highly contagious, 
painful and incurable. [d. AIDS is likewise contagious, often painful and 
invariably fatal. See Faya, 329 Md. at 439-42, 620 A.2d at 329-30. The HIV 
virus is typically transmitted through genital fluids or blood that is transmitted 
from one person to another through sexual contact, the sharing of needles in 
intravenous drug usage, blood transfusions, infiltration into wounds, or from 
mother to child during pregnancy or birth. [d. at 439, 620 A.2d at 329. Four 
separate studies conducted during the years 1985-89 failed to disclose any 
documented cases of transmission of the HIV virus from HIV infected surgeons 
to patients. [d. at 446 n.3, 620 A.2d at 332 n.3. Another study found that the 
risk of HIV transmission from infected patient to health care worker was 0.30/0 
per exposure. [d. Although the risk of HIV transmission appears to be extremely 
low, especially where the surgeon employs proper barrier techniques, the court 
of appeals recognized that the probability of harm occurring is not the sole 
factor for consideration when determining the existence of a duty. [d. at 447-
49, 620 A.2d at 333. The seriousness of the potential harm must also be 
considered. [d. at 448, 620 A.2d at 333. 
76. That basic concept is that each of us has a responsibility to exercise due care 
to avoid the unreasonable risk of harm to others. [d. 
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surgeon's blood is somehow commingled with that of the patient,77 
the court concluded that Almaraz may have owed a duty to the 
appellants to either disclose his condition or refrain from operating 
upon them.78 The court cited Sard v. Hardy79 for the proposition 
that a surgeon has a legal duty, absent emergencies, to obtain the 
"informed consent" of a patient before surgery is performed.80 An 
77. The commingling of a surgeon's blood with that of his patient is not difficult 
to envision. Professionals who perform seriously invasive procedures, such as 
a surgeon or a dentist, may puncture their skin with any number of sharp 
instruments, needles, or bone or tooth fragments. Larry Gostin, Hospitals, 
Health Care Professionals, and AIDS: the "Right to Know" the Health 
Status of Professionals and Patients, 48 MD. L. REV. 12, 20 (1989). Studies 
have indicated that a surgeon's glove will be cut or punctured in approximately 
one out of four cases. Id. at 20. A surgeon will sustain a significant cut to 
the skin in one out of 40 cases. Id. These studies demonstrate the very real 
possibility that a doctor may transmit the HIV virus to his patient. 
78. Faya, 329 Md. at 448, 620 A.2d at 333. The Faya court found overwhelming 
support for its position in a policy statement on HI V-infected physicians issued 
by the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association (the "AMA"), 
'which recommends that an infected physician either refrain from performing 
procedures that pose a significant risk of HIV transmission to a patient, or 
perform those procedures only with the patient's consent. Id. at 448-49, 620 
A.2d at 334. The report further recommended that an infected physician disclose 
his condition to a public health officer or a local review committee, which 
would then determine the activities the physician could perform. Id. at 449, 
620 A.2d at 334. The consent of both the local review committee and the 
patient would be required before the physician could perform surgery. Id. 
Because Almaraz failed to inform the appellants of his HI V-positive status, 
thereby denying them the . opportunity to withhold their consent, he may have 
breached a legal duty that may have been owed to the appellants. Id. at 459-
60, 620 A.2d at 339. Whether an actual legal duty existed was a question that 
the court believed should \Ie addressed by a jury, after an evaluation of 
Almaraz's conduct and its consequences. Id. at 460, 620 A.2d at 339. 
79. 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 101" (1977). 
80. Faya, 329 Md. at 452 n.6, 620 A.2d at 339 n.6. A comprehensive analysis of 
the doctrine of informed consent is set forth in Behringer v. Princeton Medical 
Ctr.; 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991). Behringer, an otolar-
yngologist and plastic surgeon, had his surgical privileges suspended shortly 
after being diagnosed with AIDS. Id. at 1254. In examining whether the 
doctrine of informed consent required Behringer to disclose his illness to his 
patients, the court weighed Behringer's right to perform invasive procedures 
against the patient's rights, and held that the patient's rights prevailed. Id. at 
1283. The court argued that an HIV-infected physician should withdraw from 
performing any invasive procedure that would pose a risk to a patient. Id. 
Utilizing reasoning not unlike that of the Faya court, the Behringer court 
asserted that "[w]here the ultimate harm is death, even the presence of a low 
risk of transmission justifies the adoption of a policy which precludes invasive 
procedures where there is 'any' risk of transmission .... The ultimate risk to 
the patient is so absolute-so devastating-that it is untenable to argue against 
informed consent combined with a restriction on procedures which present 'any 
risk' to the patient." Id. The court opined that "[a]s small as the risk to any 
individual patient may be," when one considers that an infected surgeon may 
perform many operations "the aggregate risk thus becomes significant." Id. 
at 1283 n.20. 
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informed consent can only be obtained when the patient is provided 
with all of the information material to the patient's decision.81 
In recognizing such a duty, the Faya court placed little emphasis 
on the trial court's assertion that the transmission of AIDS from 
doctor to patient is a mere theoretical possibility when the surgeon 
utilizes proper barrier techniques. 82 The court reasoned that even 
though the appellants did not allege an actual exposure to the HIV 
virus, it would be unfair to penalize them for lacking the information 
to establish an actual avenue of transmission of the virus into their 
bloodstreams.83 
The relevant inquiries then became whether the appellants' in-
juries were proximately caused by Dr. Almaraz's failure to inform 
them of his HIV-positive status and whether those injuries were 
legally compensable. The court accepted without elaboration that 
Almaraz's breach of his legal duty was ·the proximate cause of the 
appellants' injuries.84 The court spent considerably more time ex-
amining whether the appellants' fear and mental and emotional 
distress injuries were legally compensable. 
81. [d. The knowledge that one's surgeon is HIV-positive would likely be material 
in deciding whether to allow that surgeon to perform one's surgery. The 
importance and effect of this knowledge was considered by the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court in In re Milton S. Hershey Medical Ctr., 595 A.2d 1290 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1991), where the issue on appeal was whether the hospitals where 
an HIV -infected doctor was employed should be permitted to disclose the 
doctor's HIV -positive status. The hospitals believed that it was their duty to 
inform the doctor's patients of their potential exposure to the HIV virus and 
to offer them treatment, testing and counseling. [d. at 1293. In weighing the 
competing interests of the doctor and his patients, including the doctor's 
concerns that he would suffer both personally and professionally if his illness 
was disclosed, the court tipped the scales "in favor of the public health, 
regardless of the small potential for transmittal of the fatal virus." [d. at 1297. 
82. Faya, 329 Md. at 443, 620 A.2d at 330. Appellants did not allege that Almaraz 
failed to use these techniques, or that as a result of that failure an incident 
occurred that may have allowed the HIV virus to enter their bloodstreams. [d. 
at 443, 620 A.2d at 330-31. Accordingly, the trial court held that the appellants 
failed to establish any exposure to the HIV virus. [d. at 443, 620 A.2d at 330. 
Even if exposure had occurred, the appellants' negative test results more than 
six months after surgery made it extremely unlikely that they would develop 
AIDS. [d. at 443, 620 A.2d at 331. Hence, the trial court reasoned that absent 
any exposure to the HIV virus, the appellants' injuries resulted from the fear 
that "something that did not happen could have happened," and thus were 
not compensable. [d. The trial court dismissed the appellants' complaints for 
failure to state a legally compensable injury. [d. 
83. [d. at 457, 620 A.2d at 337. 
84. [d. at 450, 459, 620 A.2d at 334, 339. The court merely stated that appellants 
alleged facts which, if proven, "indicate that Dr. Almaraz may have breached 
a legal duty, thereby causing them to suffer legally compensable injuries." [d. 
at 459, 620 A.2d at 339. 
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Specifically, the appellants alleged that they incurred injuries 
consisting of HIV exposure and the risk of AIDS, physical injury 
and expenses resulting from blood testing for the HIV virus, pain, 
fear, anxiety, grief, nervous shock, severe emotional distress, head-
aches, and sleeplessness.85 To determine whether these were legally 
compensable injuries, the court looked to both existing Maryland 
case law and the law from other jurisdictions for guidance. 
The court first examined the divergent opinions of other juris-
dictions on the question of whether damages are available to indi-
viduals who test HIV -negative but suffer from the fear of contracting 
AIDS and the physical consequences thereof. Those courts that have 
refused to atlow the recovery of damages under these circumstances 
have often done so because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate an 
actual exposure to the HIV virus, and/or failed to suffer from any 
compensable injuries.86 
A less rigid approach has been adopted by those courts that 
have allowed the recovery of damages for emotional distress not-
withstanding HIV -negative test results. The primary focus of these 
courts has been the reasonableness of the plaintiff's fear of contract-
ing AIDS. Oftentimes, as in Johnson v. West Virginia University 
Hospital,87 the nature of the plaintiff's injuries is an element consid-
ered by the court in its evaluation of the reasonableness of the 
plaintiff's fear. 
In Johnson, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia 
allowed a police officer who tested HIV -negative after being bitten 
by an AIDS-infected patient to recover damages for emotional dis-
tress.88 The court observed that the wounds inflicted by the bite 
85. [d. at 442, 620 A.2d at 330. 
86. See Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that 
plaintiff could not recover for fear of contracting AIDS where he failed to 
allege that the syringe with which he was stuck contained contaminated blood, 
and where he tested HIV-negative at least five times during the 13 month 
period after the incident); Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 
1367 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (refusing to allow recovery to a wife whose husband had 
been negligently inflicted with the HIV virus where the wife, although exposed 
to the disease, failed to allege physical injury or illness); Transamerica Ins. 
Co. v. Doe, 840 P .2d 288 (Ariz. 1992) (holding that there was no right of 
recovery for plaintiffs who could prove exposure to HIV but who could not 
offer competent evidence of physical injury resulting therefrom); Hare v. State, 
570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (App. Div. 1991) (denying recovery to a hospital employee 
bitten by an unrestrained inmate, where the employee failed to prove that the 
inmate was infected, and where the employee tested HIV-negative); Funeral 
Servs. by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield 'Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79 (W. 
Va. 1991) (refusing to allow recovery for a mortician who had worn protective 
clothing while embalming an AIDS-infected corpse and who failed to allege 
any method of exposure to the HIV virus). 
87. 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991). 
88. [d. at 894. 
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presented an actual exposure to the HIV virus, and were thus a 
factor supporting the reasonableness of the officer's fear of contract-
ing AIDS.89 The court emphasized, however, that mere contact with 
an ,HIV-infected individual is not enough to warrant an award of 
damages; rather, both a physical exposure to the HIV virus and 
physical manifestations of emotional distress are required.90 
A more comprehensive discussion of what constitutes "reason-
able" fear was articulated by the court in Carroll v. Sisters of St. 
Francis Health Services, Inc. 91 In Carroll, a hospital visitor who was 
pricked by contaminated needles sued the hospital for damages 
allegedly occasioned by her fear of contracting AIDS.92 The plaintiff 
was unable to demonstrate both an actual exposure to the HIV virus 
and that she tested HIV-positive.93 
The Tennessee Court of Appeals, in reversing summary judgment 
entered against the plaintiff on her claim for emotional distress 
damages, relied heavily on Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating,94 which 
it construed as "set[ting] a standard of 'reasonableness' of the 
plaintiff's fear. "9S That standard implies that emotional distress 
injuries may be unreasonable if they arise after the fear of contracting 
an illness or disease becomes unrealistic.96 
The Faya court aligned itself with the approaches utilized by 
Johnson and Carroll when it determined that the appellants' fear of 
contracting AIDS was not unreasonable as a matter of law. The 
89. Id. In addition to the wounds inflicted by the bite, the officer also suffered 
injuries consisting of sleeplessness, loss of appetite, and other physical evidence 
of emotional distress. Id. at 892. 
90. Id. at 894. 
91. 868 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1993). 
92. Id. at 586. Plaintiff was pricked by the contaminated needles when she sought 
to retrieve paper towels from what she believed to be a paper towel dispenser. 
Id. The object into which plaintiff placed her right hand was actually a 
contaminated needle receptacle. Id. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the hospital 
was negligent in fjiiling to place a warning label on the receptacle, and in 
placing the receptacle adjacent to the wash basin when it so closely resembled 
a paper towel dispenser. Id. As a result of the alleged negligence, the plaintiff 
sustained injuries that included anxiety, fear, and other emotional distress. Id. 
at 587. 
93. Id. at 586-87. 
94. 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982). The plaintiffs in Laxton were permitted to 
recover damages for mental anguish arising from the ingestion of polluted 
water, notwithstanding the lack of physical symptoms indicative of an illness. 
Id. at 434. Recovery was limited, however, to the "time between discovery of 
the ingestion and the negative medical diagnosis or other information that puts 
to rest the fear of injury." Id. 
95. Carroll, 868 S.W.2d at 587. 
96. A fear of contracting an illness or disease may be deemed unrealistic if, for 
example, a negative medical diagnosis is made or, in the case of infectious 
diseases, the incubation period has expired. 
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court refused to require the appellants to prove an actual avenue of 
transmission of the HIV virus. 'T7 Nonetheless, following the lead of 
Laxton, the court declared that the appellants' continued fear of 
contracting AIDS after the receipt of their HIV -negative test results 
might be unreasonable. 98 The court thus limited the appellants' pos-
sible recovery to their reasonable window of anxiety, defined as "the 
period between which they learned of Almaraz's illness and when 
they received their HIV -negative results. "99 
The court next examined whether the nature of the appellants' 
injuries should preclude their right to recover damages for emotional 
distress. The court acknowledged the rigidity of the former Maryland 
rule that a. plaintiff could not recover for fright or mental suffering 
. arising from the negligent acts of another unless such injuries were 
connected with physical impact or injury.J()O This "physical impact" 
rule would likely have precluded the appellants' recovery because the 
only physical impact or injuries alleged were their blood tests for 
HIV antibodies. 101 Because of the gradual loosening of the physical 
impact rule in Maryland, however, which began with Green v. T.A. 
Shoemaker & Co., 102 the court concluded that the injuries suffered 
by appellants were legally compensable. 103 
The court's conclusion is well-grounded in precedent. As the 
court itself observed, similar injuries have been found compensable 
by the court of appeals in cases involving issues other than the fear 
of contracting AIDS. In Green, for example, the plaintiff suffered 
from fright and nervous shock resulting from her exposure to re-
peated rock blastings in the vicinity of her home. I04 Noting its 
inclination to allow recovery for emotional distress when "a material 
97. 329 Md. 435, 455, 620 A.2d 327, 336-37 (1993). 
98. [d. at 459, 620 A.2d at 338-39. 
99. [d. at 459, 620 A.2d at 339. 
100. [d. at 456, 620 A.2d at 337. Traditionally, Maryland courts refused to allow 
a cause of action for mere fright or mental suffering because these injuries 
can be easily simulated. Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., 11 Md. 69, 77, 73 
A. 688, 691 (1909). It is also difficult to measure the suffering occasioned by 
such injuries and to ascertain the truth thereof. [d. at 77, 73 A. at 691. 
101. Faya, 329 Md. at 441, 620 A.2d at 330. Impliedly, the physical impact or 
injury resulted from the pin prick that was made to appellants' skin as a result 
of the blood testing. 
102. 11 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909). 
103. Faya, 329 Md. at 459, 620 A.2d at 338-39. 
104. Green, 11 Md. at 71, 73 A. at 689. Although large rocks and stones were 
propelled onto the plaintiff's property, causing damage to her dwelling and 
the contents thereof, the plaintiff was never actually hit by a rock or a stone. 
[d. at 71-72, 73 A. at 689. Nevertheless, the plaintiff was put in such continual 
fear for her life that the resultant nervousness rendered her unable to perform 
her household duties. [d. at 74, 73 A. at 690. She eventually became incapac-
itated by her fright and nervousness. [d. 
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physical injury. . result[s] from fright caused by a wrongful act, "lOS 
the court of appeals held that the plaintiff's injuries were legally 
compensable notwithstanding the absence of physical impact between 
the plaintiff and a falling rock or stone.H16 The court reasoned that 
because the blasting was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's inju-
ries, and the injuries ought to have been foreseeable as a consequence 
thereof, there was no just reason to adhere to the general rule 
prohibiting recovery for nervous "affections" unaccompanied by 
physical impact. 107 
The rationale of the Green court was also the basis of the court's 
decision in Mahnke v. Moore,los where the plaintiff instituted an 
action in tort against her father for injuries which included shock, 
mental anguish and permanent nervous and physical injuries. 109 The 
court recognized the plaintiff's right to sustain an action against her 
father's estate for the emotional injuries which she suffered, not-
withstanding that those injuries were unaccompanied by physical 
impact. llo Similarly, in Vance v. Vance,1l1 plaintiff's shock, sleep-
105. Id. at 77, 173 A. at 691. Recovery would not be allowed for mere fright 
without any physical injury resulting therefrom. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 81, 173 A. at 692. 
108. 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951). 
109. Id. at 62, 77 A.2d at 924. The plaintiff's injuries resulted from several traumatic 
events. She witnessed the murder of her mother by her father, and was kept 
with her mother's dead body for six days. Id. Subsequently, the plaintiff's 
father committed suicide before her eyes, splattering the plaintiff's face and 
clothing with his blood. Id. 
110. Id. at 69, 77 A.2d at 927. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the 
Circuit Court for Wicomico County, which held that the plaintiff could not 
sustain a cause of action in tort against the executrix of her father's estate for 
personal injuries caused by his atrocious acts. Id. at 65, 77 A.2d at 924-25. In 
reversing the judgment, the court relied on the rule adopted in Green, that 
where the wrongful act complained of is the proximate cause of the injury and 
the injury should have been foreseeable, the question of damages for that 
injury should be left to the jury. Id. at 69, 77 A.2d at 926-27. The court 
further recognized that "a plaintiff can sustain an action for damages for 
nervous shock or injury caused, without physical impact, by fright arising 
directly from defendant's negligent act or omission, and resulting in some 
clearly apparent and substantial physical injury as manifested by an external 
condition or by symptoms clearly indicative of a resultant pathological, phys-
iological, or mental state." Id. at 69, 77 A.2d at 927 (quoting Bowman v. 
Williams, 164 Md. 397,404, 165 A. 182, 184 (1933». The case was remanded 
to the trial court for a determination as to whether the injuries suffered by 
plaintiff were "substantial" and thereby compensable. Id. 
The court made its ruling despite the fact that a child is generally not 
permitted to maintain an action in tort against its parent. Id. at 68, 77 A.2d 
at 926. The court circumvented this general rule by reasoning that where the 
parent tortfeasor is deceased, an attempt to maintain discipline and tranquility 
in the home by prohibiting an action in tort by a child against a parent is 
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lessness, and other nervous disorders were deemed physical injuries 
that justified recovery of damages for emotional distress. 1l2 Refusing 
to confine the term "physical" to only bodily injuries, the court 
found the plaintiff's injuries compensable because the injuries were 
capable of objective determination. 1I3 
More recently, in B.N. v. K.K.,1I4 the court of appeals held that 
a nurse who contracted genital herpes from a doctor who failed to 
inform her of his infection prior to their sexual relations could be 
compensated for emotional distress if she could objectively demon-
strate the severity of her injuries. m 
illogical. Id. The court further reasoned that the parent-child relationship was 
not in need of protection, where as in Mahnke, the parent forfeited his parental 
authority and privileges by the commission of such cruel and inhumane acts. 
Id. 
Ill. 286 Md. 490, .408 A.2d 728 (1979). After nearly 20 years of marriage and after 
bearing two children, the plaintiff learned that her husband was not divorced 
from his first wife at the time of his purported marriage to the plaintiff. Id. 
at 492-93, 408 A.2d at 729-30. As a result, the plaintiff was unable to function 
normally, could not sleep, and was too embarrassed to socialize with even 
those individuals who were attempting to be kind to her. Id. at 493, 408 A.2d 
at 730. The plaintiff sued her husband for compensatory damages for emotional 
distress that she allegedly suffered as a result of his negligent misrepresentation 
concerning the status of their marriage. Id. at 492-93, 408 A.2d at 729. She 
also sought damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, which 
she alleged resulted from his negligent misrepresentation and her subsequent 
knowledge of their true marital status. Id. 
112. Id. at 501, 408 A.2d at 134. The plaintiff's claim for damages was based upon 
her husband's negligent misrepresentation. Id. The plaintiff's evidence was 
insufficient, however, to establish the separate tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Id. at 504, 408 A.2d at 735. To impose liability for this 
tort, a defendant's conduct must be intentional or reckless, the conduct must 
be extreme and outrageous, there must be a causal connection between the 
wrongful conduct and the emotional distress, and the emotional distress must 
be severe. Id. The court refused to hold that the defendant's conduct in Vance 
was intentional, reckless, extreme or outrageous. Id. at 506, 408 A.2d at 737. 
113. Id. at 501, 408 A.2d at 734. The court opined that "physical" merely means 
that the injury for which recovery is sought is capable of objective determi-
nation. Id. at 500, 408 A.2d at 733-34. In this case, the plaintiff's injuries 
were manifested in her external condition. Id. at 501, 408 A.2d at 734. The 
deterioration of the plaintiff's physical appearance was evidenced by her 
unkempt hair, sunken cheeks and dark eyes. Id. 
114. 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988). This case was before the court of appeals 
on a question certified by the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland. Id. at 135, 538 A.2d at 1176. The certified question, which the 
court answered in the affirmative, was: "Does Maryland Recognize A Cause 
Of Action For Either Fraud, Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress, Or 
Negligence Resulting From The Sexual Transmission Of A Dangerous, Con-
tagious, And Incurable Disease, Such As Genital Herpes?" Id. 
115. Id. at 147-49, 538 A.2d at 1181-82. As a prerequisite to this finding, the court 
first determined that the plaintiff could maintain a cause of action in negligence 
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Thus, in allowing the appellants to recover for their injuries, the 
Faya court did not depart significantly from the court of appeals' 
prior rulings allowing recovery for emotional distress. Its decision in 
Faya was a logical extension of Green and Mahnke, which require 
that emotional distress injuries be a proximate result of the wrongful 
act of another, and Vance and B.N., which require that those injuries 
be capable of objective determination. Accordingly, having alleged 
facts that, if proven, would establish that Almaraz owed the appel-
lants a legal duty, that such duty was breached, and that their injuries 
were the proximate cause of that breach, the appellants could recover 
damages for emotional distress if the injuries resulting therefrom 
were capable of objective determination. 1I6 
Of course, an award of damages would not be made unless Dr. 
Almaraz was negligent. In this regard, Faya will have little impact 
upon existing Maryland law. Instead, its impact can be found in the 
court's willingness to allow recovery of damages for the fear that 
something which could have happened did not occur. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
To its proponents, the Faya decision represents a logical exten-
sion of existing Maryland case law and does nothing more than 
reaffirm the court's belief that recompense should be available to 
individuals suffering from emotional distress, although unaccompa-
nied by physical injury, where those injuries are a proximate result 
against the doctor. [d. at 143, 538 A.2d at 1179. It held that because the 
doctor had a highly infectious disease, and because the danger of transmitting 
that disease to others with whom he came into contact was foreseeable, the 
doctor had a duty to take reasonable precautions to avoid transmission of the 
disease. [d. This duty was breached when the doctor failed to inform the 
plaintiff of his condition and failed to refrain from engaging in sexual contact 
with her. [d. When the plaintiff became infected with genital herpes as a result 
of her contact with the doctor, she thereby suffered injuries proximately caused 
by the doctor's breach of his duty. [d. 
The court then addressed the plaintiff's claim against the defendant for 
the intentional infliction of emotional distress. There are four elements that 
must be established to recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. See supra note 112. The element which requires that the emotional 
distress be severe does not require that it produce total emotional or physical 
disablement. [d. at 148-49, 538 A.2d at 1181. The B.N. court held that the 
plaintiff's case satisfied the first three elements of the tort, but remanded the 
case to the jury to determine whether the plaintiff's emotional distress was 
severe. [d. at 148-49, 538 A.2d at 1182. 
116. See supra note 3. The case was remanded to the Circuit Court for Baltimore 
City for further proceedings to determine the truth of the appellants' allegations. 
Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 459, 620 A.2d 327, 339 (1993). 
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of the defendant's breach of a legal duty. Critics of the decision 
may believe otherwise. 
At a time when reported cases of AIDS and other sexually 
transmitted diseases are on the rise, it may be argued that the Faya 
decision will open a Pandora's box.l17 The willingness of Maryland 
courts to allow recovery of damages for emotional distress resulting 
solely from the fear of contracting a disease, especially where the 
disease does not materialize, may significantly increase litigation and 
the amount of damages recoverable where none may have been 
recovered previously.118 On the other hand, where the consequences 
of a defendant's wrongful act are severe, it seems equitable to allow 
a plaintiff to recover damages resulting from any legitimate injuries 
arising from defendant's conduct, whether those injuries are to the 
mind or the body. 
Where the transmission of AIDS is at issue, public policy may 
dictate that recovery be made available for those suffering from the 
fear of contracting the disease, even where the likelihood of infection 
is minimal. The Faya decision appears to embrace this view. Rather 
than focus on the probability of the appellants' infection under the 
circumstances of the case, the court of appeals focused on the fatal 
consequences of the harm that would have resulted had the appellants 
been infected. By acknowledging the seriousness of the potential 
harm, the court implied that an HIV-infected physician should refrain 
from performing surgery altogether. This may be especially appro-
priate where, as with AIDS, all avenues of transmission of the 
infectious disease are not yet known. Although there are no docu-
mented cases of AIDS transmission from surgeon to patient,1I9 it 
may be prudent to err on the side of caution, particularly where the 
potential consequences are so profound. 
117. This fear may be justified. Less than nine months after the Faya decision, 
more than 30 former patients of Dr. Almaraz commenced suit against his estate 
alleging emotional distress injuries similar to those experienced by Faya and 
Rossi. Jay Apperson, Ex-Patients of Doctor who Died of AIDS File Suit, The 
Sun, Nov. 24, 1993, at 4B. Johns Hopkins Hospital corresponded with over 
1,800 of the doctor's patients to disclose his illness. Id. It is conceivable, 
therefore, that many more of Dr. Almaraz's patients will bring similar actions 
against his estate. 
U8. See supra note 117. 
119. See supra note 75. This argument may no longer be persuasive. The first 
reported case of possible HIV transmission from a health care worker to a 
patient was reported by the Centers for Disease Control on July 27, 1990. 
Jane H. Barney, Comment, A Health Care Worker's Duty to Undergo Routine 
Testing for HIVIAIDS and to Disclose Positive Results to Patients, 52 LA. L. 
REV. 933, 934 (1992). The report indicated that a Florida dentist was believed 
to have transmitted the HIV virus to Kimberly Bergalis and at least two of his 
other patients. Id. at 934. 
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The Faya decision appears to take such an approach by estab-
lishing a legal duty beyond that recommended by the AMA policy 
statement that HIV -infected physicians refrain from activity posing 
a significant risk of HIV transmission;l20 it implies that any risk of 
transmission, however slight, is patently unacceptable. 121 Although 
the court cited Sard v. Hardyl22 for the proposition that an HIV-
infected physician may have a legal duty to inform a patient of his 
infection, the implications of the court's decision are that a mere 
warning is not enough. 
The court's decision does not imply that a plaintiff has the carte 
blanche right to recover damages for emotional distress resulting 
from the fear of contracting AIDS or any other infectious disease. 
The Faya court wisely limits such recovery only to those injuries 
which are reasonable, that is, to those injuries that occur between 
the time a plaintiff learns of the possibility of infection and the time 
when the plaintiff's fear is put to rest. 123 Any fear which continues 
after that period may be unreasonable, and therefore uncompensa-
ble. 124 By requiring that such injuries also be objectively demon-
strated,125 the court seeks to ensure that the injuries are genuine and 
not merely simulated. In light of these safeguards, the Faya decision 
should not significantly increase the probability of fictitious claims 
for emotional distress. 
V. CONCLUSION 
With the Faya decision, the court of appeals has legitimatized 
injuries to the mind, but has indicated its cognizance of the fact that 
such injuries must remain subject to close scrutiny. The Faya decision 
is a successful blend of reason and compassion. To deny recovery 
to a plaintiff whose injuries are capable of objective determination 
merely because that plaintiff was not physically injured in the tra-
ditional sense is to imply that the mind, which exercises ultimate 
domain over the body, is somehow less worthy of protection. This 
is a notion that Faya will hopefully dispel. The decision does not 
impose any greater burden on plaintiffs suffering from genuine 
injuries; instead, it serves to curtail frivolous claims while allowing 
those individuals who have genuinely suffered at the negligent hands 
of another an opportunity for recovery·. 
120. Faya, 329 Md. at 450-51, 620 A.2d at 334. 
121. [d. 
122. 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977). 
123. Faya, 329 Md. at 455, 620 A.2d at 337. 
124. [d. 
125. [d. at 459, 620 A.2d at 338-39. 
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By also suggesting that a physician infected with the. HIV virus 
may have a legal duty to inform his patient of such infection, the 
court has demonstrated a willingness to place the sanctity of human 
life over all other concerns. To refuse to require a physician to 
disclose his HIV -positive status because of concerns regarding the 
physician's privacy and ability to earn a living would be the equivalent 
. of giving those who have the power to cure the power to kill as 
well. 
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